put in ru

After May 7 till 15 August, Vladimir Putin’s second inauguration one hundred days has passed. This term is considered to be the checkpoint of the first results of any project. In policy it is used to define the preliminary results of the cabinet or administration, which has won last elections. Though in chronology the image of the present Russian President is many-sided as well as in other characteristic features and gives reasons for at least two meanings of the same sign, legally the second term of office started after the moment of the oath administration. Putin used updating of his powers to scale the plan of modernization with strong liberal notes (Address-2004) and to carry rather unpopular social reform. He decided to replace the privileges with monetary payments being a step less expected from the president who had all chances to become the captive of own rating getting used to the record level of popularity. It is curious that at the same time administrative reform reaches the power structures. During these summer months political dismantle of oligarchy has come to the end. The amendment to the law “On referendum” and the elective legislation reform generate big doubts that it would be changed with a liberal democracy.

“Gazeta.Ru” and Newsweek have noted a symbolical boundary of the second term of office. On August 13 the Internet-newspaper published the report from a session of one of political clubs on this theme. The magazine summed up the results on June 22.

The fact of a different interpretation of symbolical date should not surprise. Vladmir Putin has more hundred days’ anniversaries than any another political figure of a comparable level in the newest Russian history.

First of them after the appointment for a post of the Prime Minister on August 9 1999, was marked with unprecedented rise of political trust and recognition as the national leader.

If to consider it absolutely scrupulously the second hundred days should be calculated after this appointment was sanctioned by Duma on August 16. But it has no sense. The time discrepancy between the presidential decree and voting in parliament was insignificant. The periods of formation of a new political epoch have coincided.

During the third hundred days boundary after the appointment in the quality as the acting President of the Russian Federation on December 31 1999 the main event was the elections on March 26 2000. It reoriented observers on bringing the first results of Putin’s board in the future. Inauguration (on May 7 2000) has repeated this phenomenon concerning the fourth period of hundred days.

By an outcome of the fifth hundred days Vladimir Putin already could show the voters some sort of portfolio. The military victory in Chechnya and creation of the power vertical fixed the first positions achieved in the performance of the slogan on the elementary order in the country. The plan of the tax reform and simplification of enterprises’ registration have strengthened economic growth outlined. The new law on political parties and the declared interest to real independence of the media have fastened a general direction of the political mode development. The rigid rhetoric in conversation with the USA has shown that the new president is ready to assert Russian national interests seriously. The initiative to create the European antimissile defense and expansion of diplomatic activity on all azimuths have shown the flexibility and ability to find dissymetric responses to America which policy caused the increasing irritation in Russia.

Today the seventh honey period has ended. Its political results as a whole were strategically predicted in its tactical unpredictability. This form of stability is one of the basic sides of Vladimir Putin’s image. Probably that’s why in a number of key parameters the expected results of this summer do not surprise.

The changes took place during some key events. The first of them is the National Address to the Federal Assembly.

The Address-2004 is a liberal declaration about liberal intentions

The main political document of the year contained all correct and pertinent words for the history. The requirements of respectability showed to the democratic country are observed to the full. It is necessary to note that during Vladimir Putin’s stay at powers the press never showed such preliminary awareness on the Address. The maintenance of Putin’s speeches was kept in a secret until the last minute. It became even original tradition. This time, the basic themes are development and reform of public health services and education, development of the market of accessible habitation, modernization of army and reform of the social sphere – became known and have started to be discussed in press even before the speech.

Putin’s fifth address and the first after the re-election could be considered through a prism of all previous ones only. The press fixed the stability of the liberal development in economy noting the toughening of the social and economic problems: to reduce inflation up to 3 % and the number poor twice by 2007, to double GDP by 2010 (the Address-2003 supposed to make it in 10 years).

However, speaking about these reforms the president called to not tighten a belt telling about improvement of a life of citizens. It allowed some analysts to assume that there was a transformation aside paternalistic state. Social reform of the summer has denied these estimations.

Vladimir Putin spoke about increase of a living standard this time extremely much. Concrete figures are named: 30 million people live below a level of poverty. Decrease in inflation to 3 % means aspiration to come nearer to the standard of the countries of the European Community: 2 %. In other words the Address had extremely economic and managerial character. It has continued traditions of Putin’s style. The big place in discussion of the Address-2004 took a guessing of analysts about what Putin preferred to hold back. It is Chechnya  (the question was dissolved in a foreign policy part in the context of struggle against terrorism) and army (the monetary component of reform has left on the foreground). Vladimir Putin did not mention the issue of the parties’ integration and on the idea of transition to elections to the Duma extremely under the party lists. President missed to say about the main political event of 2003 – a victory of “United Russia” at elections to the State Duma. Meanwhile the discussion of the elective legislation reform took place since May. In the beginning of August on behalf of the Central Elective Commission specific proposals in this occasion were formulated.

In brief the idea of the reform looks like that:

Voters in each constituent member of the Russian Federation vote not only for the party but also for the concrete candidate from its regional list; if the party as a whole breaks the seven-percentage threshhold established by the law, places in Duma are received by those its candidates for whom voted the majority of voters in regions; the proportional system is distributed to all 450 places in Duma.

The address-2004 says nothing about the necessity to reform the legislation on a referendum. Meanwhile, the amendments accepted for these months extremely bureaucratized this procedure. Now it can really be taken advantage by the authority leaning on the ramified structures and administrative resource only. The new law first of all is directed against the Communist Party of the Russian Federation which the last year already tried to initiate a referendum on questions of increase of salaries, decrease in tariffs for services of housing and communal services and nationalization of strategic branches.

Administrative reform: when the dreams come true

The second significant event of the past period is a long waited and suddenly started Administrative reform.

Opened by Putin know-how method of voters’ activity amplification is the pre-electoral resignation of the government (on February, 24, 2004) appeared to be multi-purposed. The large-scaled staff reduction and re-structuring of all official system became possible thanks to the reformation of the federal bureaucratic platform.

The reform began from the reorganization of the Presidential Administration. Its first attributes appeared right after Alexander Voloshin’s resignations, but the active phase took about two months. On April 21 its head Dmitry Medvedev signed the order “On distribution of duties between officials of administration of the president of the Russian Federation”.

His five former deputies became assistants to the head of the state with rather large powers. Political results expressed the fact that earlier the president was a figure of the compromise between old and new officials. Now he dominates and rules.

Actual merge of the cabinet and Putin’s own office in the uniform government has finished the reform of his administration. The precise signal was sent that all departments would be resulted in a uniform denominator including power structures. The majority of observers assumed that it is hardly possible. Nevertheless it has taken place. Reform has successfully passed through the governmental level and is cunning up to each of power bodies.

Government

Right after the repeated appointment of the cabinet (resignation of the Government was necessary by virtue of the constitutional norm ordering this procedure after inauguration) Vladimir Putin at the meeting with prime-minister Mikhail Fradkov let know that he expects the further diminution of the administrative device and reorganization of federal departments. The ideology of reform of the Federal Government was to liquidate the internal conflict when the same department writes laws, carries out supervision of their execution, adjusts access on the markets and through the subordinated enterprises renders commercial services. Therefore the three-tier system has been generated: the ministries, services and agencies.

On March 9 the number of the ministries, as is known, was reduced by the decree from 23 up to 14 but the general number of departments has grown from 59 up to 73. Such structure was recognized to be imperfect. Federal Hydro-metereology and Environmental Monitoring Service was simply forgotten. Power ministries were indignant because of disappearance of committee on a geodesy and cartography, whose services used. The presidential decree from May 20 specified the structure of federal bodies. Their total number is equal to 81.

Mikhail Fradkov insisted on deducing of supervision from ministers and on subordinating them to him. However, most likely it would have contradicted to the pyramidal ideology to create an executive vertical and would have reanimated Prime Minister as an independent political center.

On August 11 Vladimir Putin signed the bill into the law “On the state civil service of the Russian Federation”. It assigns to officials the right and obligations, sets in the system of payment for their work.

It has a number of novels. For the first time the conclusion of the service contract with officials is provided. The evolution from privileged medical care of the state employees to medical insurance and accumulative principle of pension formation for a long service is planned.

The law sets in four categories of official status: the head, the assistant (counselor), the expert and the providing expert, which are in its turn subdivided into five groups: the maximum, main, leading, senior and younger. The class grades are also provided.

Foreign Ministry

Foreign Ministry turned to be the first ministry directly subordinated to the president as a result of Administrative reform. The number of deputy foreign ministers will be reduced from 12 up to 7 while the central staff from 3,500 people to 3,028 people.

The mere ideological directions of its work have been changed. To double GDP foreign investments are demanded. According to President ambassadors should assist the process of insuring potential investors of Russia economic attractiveness

Interior Ministry

After long meditations and discussions the top management of the country has decided not to experiment and stop on the softest variant of “power reform.” “Quiet” character of the decrees puts the end to conversations about crushing Internal Ministry on a number of independent services and departments. Instead of the current main and “ordinary” directorates, the ministry will have no more than 15 departments covering the main areas of its work.

The Interior Ministry will change only in terms of its internal structures and the names of some departments. Its major components, such as the Investigation Committee and the Chief Command of Interior Troops will remain intact. Variants of creation of separate departments of a state traffic inspectorate (on the basis of motor licensing and inspection department), on tax and economic crimes, on maintenance of public and criminal order are being discussed.

The reform is carried out for unification of the ministries and departments. Therefore central administrative boards of the Internal Ministry will be titled departments as in the civil ministries. In total such departments will be equal to 15. Its major components, such as the Investigation Committee as a basis for future Federal Investigation Service and the Chief Command of Interior Troops, which later is supposed to be transformed into the National Guard will remain intact.

The total number of the Internal Ministry’s central device is determined. It will make 2970 person. Till now there were 3800 established posts in the central device. The new table of equipment and organization of the central device establishes 2222 militia posts, 545 – military men of internal armies, 203 – state employees.

FSB

When Putin signed the decree about new structure of executive authority and entrusted to present offers on the power block self-reforming, siloviki especially responsible for safety of the nation were seemed not to be touched at all. It was confirmed also with employees of power departments, and officials in Putin’s administration. Firstly FSB as the structure was not discussed at all as an object of reforming.

It contains secret and open parts. The number of FSB deputy directors will be reduced from 12 (including three first deputies) to four (with two first deputies). The director and his deputies will be equal to a Russian Minister and his Deputies in terms of status. FSB departments will be entrusted with services’ status and contain their own departments and agencies. Though renaming of FSB into the Ministry of State Security will not take place, a number of experts mark with fear strengthening positions of this power department. At the same time, representatives of special services disagree with these fears or dissatisfied with insufficient FSB amplification.

Within the framework of administrative reform FSB has considerably raised the status. Its name though remains former, but department has actually received ministry structure and powers. The decree also raises the status of the FSB’s top officers: the director and his deputies will be equal to a Russian minister and his deputies in terms of status, wages, social and living conditions, and medical coverage.

Defense Ministry

It is known, that the chief of the General Staff had essentially different from Sergey Ivanov’s point of view concept of military department functioning. Kvashnin supported preservation and even amplification of the General Staff’s role, when Defense Ministry became mainly a civil department involved in personnel, armament and legislative activity, etc. Such succession of events obviously did not suit Sergey Ivanov. Leaning on Vladimir Putin’s support Minister has put forward and actively realizes his own concept of Armed forces management where the Ministry is supposed to be the basic managing body. The General Staff is deprived of the armed troops managerial functions, which now are carried out by Minister with the help of one of his first deputies. The General Staff will exercise mainly strategic planning.

End of oligarchy: well-chosen enemy

During the past period the withdrawal from oligarchic system has been finally politically made out. Symbolical event, which has designated this mark in history, became a long-awaited meeting of the president with representatives of business circles.

The majority of observers did not miss the chance to note the circumstance that the action was appointed not as usually in the main hall of the Big Kremlin palace but in the guest extension. Observers state opinions that thus the Administration of the head of the state showed businessmen their true place under the sun. The conversation passed on the logic designated by the president. Experts were left in opinion that in all two hours of the conversation nobody touched the main questions of a present situation.

Thus, one of chosen for Putin opponents, oligarchs finally discharged of political processes. The problem of lobbying in damage of the state interests also in this sense should look decided.

Social reform: love and money

To start the second term of office with stability of authority for Vladimir Putin should be recognized as a political background ideal. The platform was cleared away and was practically exclusively taken by the party “United Russia”, which main slogan is support of the president. The system of oligarchy is demounted.

Regional elites have been pushed finally aside from game at a federal level of political authority. There was no more sense to appeal to them: barrier on a way of realization of nation-wide problems are eliminated, all is made quickly and effectively to put into practice a policy of the federal center.

On all parameters the perfect conditions for the major reforms, which, first of all, should release the state budget from excessive social mandates build a rigid and transparent budgetary policy. Key item is the replacement of privileges with monetary payments.

Discussion of the most complex from political point of view reform of Vladimir Putin’s second term is Soviet social security system’s dismantle, which reaches critical degree. There is a fear that presidential constitutional majority in the State Duma is under the threat. Mass meetings show that explanatory work for the population appeared insufficient. Intensity of television propagation could not replace propaganda in person to person format. Here United Russia appeared to be a weak ally for Putin. There is already no mutual consent with a number of reform positions inside the party at a level of Duma committees.

Nevertheless, this major and extremely unpopular step has been made. Putin has shown ability to be equally effective in a role of the political leader compelled to think of the following elections and to roles of the statesman thinking what will be with the country in 10 years.

G8/2004 and relations with world powers

Becoming of a political mode of Putin’s second term has taken place in extremely favorable international conditions – the need of Russian presence in traditional zones of world influence has increased (the Balkans, for example), Europe has been limited with a hope of Kioto protocol ratification (to speed up process of preparation for ratification, but not ratification itself), the USA required support of the new resolution on Iraq and the initiative under ” the Broader Middle East.”

Putin’s conservative strategy in world policy provides him with allies. Europeans are fed up by the U.S. administration’s ambitions. Arabic leaders are frightened by Washington’s efforts to legitimate its interference into their domestic policy. The summit’s discussion of American initiatives on the Middle East modernization, the adoption of the SC UN resolution on transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi government are the reasons for Moscow to strengthen its positions.

Russian press gives a good mark to the SC UN resolution on Iraq. At expressing its attitude to American mission in Iraq Moscow acted highly diplomatically. American initiatives on the Broader Middle East as predicted were neutralized. G8 leaders supported the refusal to transfer equipment and technologies of uranium enrichment and processing within the next year, says the non-proliferation plan adopted at the summit. It will be high on the agenda of the following G-8 summit in Great Britain 2005.

Vladimir Putin expects the Middle East democratic process to be of great importance as monetary resources being wielded by a group of persons are another cause of terrorism. During G-8 summit Russia clearly gave to understand that democratization cannot be used as a pretext for interference into home policy. Moscow’s participation in the Broader Middle East initiative will depend on the observance of this term.

Becoming a regional world power

The system of Russian unions declared by Vladimir Putin on the first term of office began to find precise organizational structure and systematical character in the beginning of the second one. The burden of the geopolitical inheritance of Soviet Union and Russian empire in process of opportunities is better for dividing it with neighbors.

Shinghai Cooperation Organization

At his first term of office Vladimir Putin argued of a system of Russian allies. Now it gains strict and delineated form and structure. Nowadays Shanghai Cooperation Organization is transforming into a pan-Asian alliance providing regional stability. Its main tasks are terrorism struggle and aide to Afghanistan. Russia and China together with other summiteers are aiming to restrict the U.S. military and political activities in the region. Moscow states to fulfill the power vacuum by the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Chinese cooperation in the sphere of countering modern threats and challenges is a unique opportunity to involve the Medium Power in the system of global security. The first practical action of the SCO summit was the ceremony of official opening of the operating Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), created to exchange information concerned with the struggle against terrorism.

CIS

The policy with CIS countries is proved to be precisely pragmatic. While delivering a long speech at a Security Council session on July 19, Vladimir Putin made a number of significant statements related to the Commonwealth of Independent States. According to the Russian leader, the CIS is not effective enough in its current form and the protracted reform process threatens this international organization with further decline, if not worse.

Mr Putin stressed that the CIS had now reached a decisive moment. In essence, member states are faced with a choice: either they work to qualitatively strengthen the CIS, and make it a genuinely working, influential regional structure in the world, or this geopolitical organization will become irrelevant. “Moscow should prevent this turn of events,” the president stated emphatically.

Uniform Economic Space

Uniform economic space (UES) is one of new integration projects called to strengthen the previous associations on the post Soviet space or to replace them. Symbolically repeating the formula of writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn declared for the first time at the end of 80th. XX centuries is addressed by Russia first of all for Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan only.

At UES summit in Yalta on May, 24 Vladimir Putin precisely declared that he is going to achieve signing key working agreements to the beginning of 2006. However observers noticed that disputes between presidents about quantity of the documents necessary for UES high-grade functioning are not an occasion for optimistic forecasts.

In Yalta leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus could not sign any document allowing UES to operate. Sources in Russian delegation recognized that UES could not take place till problems concerning Russia and Ukraine unsolved. It will not happen at least in the nearest half-year before presidential elections in Ukraine.

Kazakhstan is interested in decrease in tariff transport loading. Ukraine is in decrease in loading on railroad rates. Among key interests of Russia is the establishment of a national treatment for investments. The Belarus president Alexander Lukashenko who ingenuously openly declared doubts of UES future that it risks to turn to the structure similar to CIS.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization

The heads of states incorporated in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) have welcomed elaboration of efficient mechanisms for countering modern threats and challenges, especially drug smuggling from Afghanistan and prevention export of terrorism from the country. A plan of joint exercises by the collective rapid-deployment force to be held not only for military operations but also for countering drag traffics and terror groups neutralization.

Ukraine

The high level of personal trust to Putin in the countries of the near abroad dictates necessity for local politicians to show close and confidential relations with the owner of Kremlin. In this sense Ukraine not only no exception to the rule but is the most eloquent example. Victor Janukovicha’s pre-election task is to support image of Putin’s friend and by the end of campaign to distance from Kuchma to get voices of the western areas. Victor Jushchenko’s objective is even not to receive the terrible characteristics of a politic not to agree with Putin.

Leonid Kuchma’s decision to exclude from the Military doctrine of Ukraine the thesis about preparation for membership in NATO and European Community is a result of Kremlin’s new intentional policy direction with Belarus and Ukraine at Putin’s.

Ukrainian management asserts that such serious changes were brought at a session of Ukraine and NATO top-level commission, taken place at the end of June in Istanbul during NATO summit taking place there.

Such turn of Kiev from the West on the East can be considered as an obvious victory of Moscow over rivalry for influence on Ukraine. On the other hand, it is a payment of the Ukrainian political elite led by Kuchma for support of Moscow before Ukrainian presidential elections forthcoming on October 31.

Kazakhstan

There is a problem of Kazakhstan air defense systems modernization.

Kazakhstan has not yet concluded an agreement with Britain’s Bae Systems on modernizing its air defense systems but such proposals are being considered.

Kazakh Defense Minister admitted the on-going talks with Bae Systems but remarked that there is no likelihood of an agreement to be signed in the near future. He believes that air defense modernization should be regarded from the angle of adaptation to the Kazakh armament systems.

Kazakh Defense Ministry and Russian official sources and comes to a conclusion that Kazakhstan has frightened Russia to start at long last its air defense systems modernization.

Belarus

The press is not surprised at all by the forgoing closure of representation of a federal TV-channel in allied Belarus. The public opinion has finally written down Alexander Lukashenko in one number with exotic modes, which are more habitually seen in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The fact that it became possible in the center of Europe is probably one of unpredictable consequences of the big cataclysm titled disintegration of the Soviet empire.

The essence of the Belarus question for Vladimir Putin may most likely be formed in the following way. How to keep a present level of communications between peoples in conditions of potential instability in the event of Lukashenko to press through the third term? Potential danger of anti-Russian moods growth should be mentioned as an additional factor. On the one hand, accusing Kremlin in support of dictatorship the opposition can play on this thesis, on other aspiring to lead Constitutional referendum without Moscow’s content Lukashenko more and more persistently addresses to national instincts.

Crises: doubtful prognosis

In first hundred days of the second term Vladimir Putin has collided with three serious calls: murder of the president of the Chechen Republic Ahmad Kadyrov, invasion of rebels into Ingushetia and the danger of a new conflict in Georgian autonomies.

As a whole the aggravation of the situation on Caucasus should be considered in a wide context of the general situation between Northern Africa and Southeast Asia (so-called “the Arch of instability”). During last decade this territory balances on the verge of hit in a number of the states in which the population has no social prospects, but is extremely susceptible to political and religious alarms.

Chechnya

Presidential elections in Chechnya are considered to be the first large political event opening a new political season. Registration of the candidates already comes to an end. Today the press actively discusses the results of nominations. Forecasts of the analysts who in May declared that forthcoming elections would be very similar to the previous ones were justified. The political stake is counted on a figure of police general Alu Alkhanov. Kremlin has decided that for today it’s just him who shows ability to continue the strategy, which fixes all key roles in a former rebellious province for local, loyal to the federal center leaders to limit a disputed zone of Russian Caucasus with Chechnya. It is defied by other strategy aiming expansion of  “Arches of instability” on other territories. Invasion at Ingushetia on June 22 and yesterday’s explosions in Dagestan show main thrusts’ directions.

Meanwhile in August it was found out that there are certain plans to cancel presidential elections in Chechnya and set in a mode of the state of emergency in the republic. Thus it is offered to establish a post of special presidential plenipotentiary on a management of counter-terrorist operation on Northern Caucasus. He will be simultaneously acting as the head of the administration of the Chechen Republic. This post of office is to be established at least for two years and taken by “the skilled and resolute commander” i.e. the representative of military. The motivation is simple – the situation in Chechnya, especially after spot-check of militants to Ingushetia and large-scaled actions in Avtury, Kizlyar and Аrgun went out of control.

Ingushetia

Vladimir Putin’s reaction to the Russian generals failures in Ingushetia on June 22 links with large-scaled reshuffles in Russia’s Army. President dismissed Anatoly Kvashnin, chief of the General Staff, Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, chief commander of the interior troops, Mikhail Labunets, commander of the North Caucasus district of the interior troops, and Anatoly Yezhkov, deputy director of the FSB. Yuri Baluyevsky, former first deputy of Gen. Kvashnin, has been appointed in place of his ex-boss. Alexander Baranov has been transferred to the post of commander of the North-Caucasus military district from the Volga-Urals district. Commander of the North-Caucasus military district Vladimir Boldyrev was sent to the Volga-Urals district.

Georgia

The level of self-control shown by Putin during Abkhazia and South Ossetia crisis should demonstrate Tbilisi, Tskhinvali and Sukhumi that the essence of the problem is in minimization of effects of the active phase of the conflict.

The essence of the problem is that “Russia at large” considers Georgia to be a big southern port, which from Moscow’s point of view should work in full production capacities as soon as possible. Political stability and skilled local manager are worth having for it.

Mikhail Saakashvili does not conceal the fact that first President of independent Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia is his political ideal. It seems natural that intentionally or not he tries to repeat or surpass the object of his imitation. Before the direct threats to sink the boats with Russian tourists we could hope that unlike his idol Mr. Saakashvili is a self-controlled man less extremist in his actions.

After a month from the beginnings of the second phase of Georgia unification it became obvious that the way of direct conversation with people of autonomies together with legitimate pressure upon authorities well worked in Adjaria, but does not do the same in Ossetia. First, because here blood of 1992 and several years of a separate life political consciousness of the uniform nation has been broken off. Secondly, the local elite does not recognize leadership of Tbilisi. Taking into account logic of revolutionary process the decision on equal negotiations is a step for Mikhail Saakashvili on complexity parallel with Vladimir Putin’s bell to George Bush after terrorist attacks on September, 11. New Georgian President not once stated intention to learn political mastership at his Russian counterpart. But he demonstrated his unwillingness to learn something. The beginning of August is known by a number of confrontations with casualties.

The logic of the conflict development pushes Tbilisi to a power variant. Now when depending on him in many respects the peace or military strategy of national construction will take top Mikhail Saakashvili’s ability to guide the situation passes through the checkpoint.

Vladimir Putin has higher freedom of maneuver and his positions are stronger. However it does not mean that Moscow can allow the tactics of pacification. Besides the idea that it’s high time for Russia to lift the glove thrown by Mikhail Saakashvili and to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia expands a circle of the advocates.

Russian medias still do not see an integral strategy in Moscow’s policy on Caucasus. The consensus of media in this issue is that the situation slips to the war. In case of an output on the international level Russia’s position looks very weak. Simultaneously the voices of military lobby appeals to direct a more hard line.